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Cohen and Englander: Board of Education, Wyandanch Union Free School District v. Wyand

BOARD OF EDUCATION,
WYANDANCH UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT v.
WYANDANCH TEACHERS ASSOCIATION*
RELATIONS-Arbitrability-Grievance pertaining to public employer's payment of salary increments under
expired collective bargainingagreement containing survivor clause is
nonarbitrableper se. 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d
Dep't 1977).
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR

In Board of Education, Wyandanch Union Free School District
v. Wyandanch Teachers Association,' the Second Department of the
New York Appellate Division presents disturbing implications for
the effectiveness of collective bargaining between public employers
and employees. The decision may constitute a severe setback to
New York State's civil servants. It sets dangerous precedent by sanctioning a court's unwarranted interference in the dispute settlement
process, and by ignoring settled principles of public sector labor law
to reach a contrived result.
The Board of Education, Wyandanch Union Free School District (the Board) and the Wyandanch Teachers Association (the Association) entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering
the period of September 1, 1973, up to and including August 31,
1976. The agreement provided a multistep grievance procedure
culminating in binding arbitration. 2 This procedure afforded the parties an internal means of dispute settlement without resort to the

* This comment was written before the case appeared in the official reports. The
case name that appears therein is Board of Education of the Wyandanch Union Free
School District v. Wyandanch Teachers Association.
1. 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977).
2. When a dispute arises between the Association and the Board, the Association
may file a grievance with the Board setting forth the nature of the dispute. The first
step of the grievance procedure entails an informal discussion between the school
principal or the teacher's immediate supervisor and a representative of the Association
and the teacher involved. If the dispute remains unresolved at this stage, the second
step is undertaken, which involves a more formal meeting with the district principal
and the president of the Association and/or his designated representative. Lastly, if the
dispute remains unresolved, the Association may submit the matter to an arbitrator for
a final and binding determination. This grievance procedure is set forth in Contract
Between Wyandanch Board of Education and Wyandanch Teachers Association,
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courts. This type of grievance procedure reflects the sentiment of
the New York Court of Appeals that arbitration is the preferred
3
means of settling labor disputes.

Such a dispute occurred when, after the expiration of the

agreement, the Board failed to pay teachers salary increments for
the academic year commencing September 1, 1976, according to

the schedule set forth in the contract. 4 As the recognized bargaining representative 5 of the teachers employed by the Board, the Association wished to bring the matter to binding arbitration since

the parties failed to resolve the dispute at the initial steps of the
grievance procedure. The Board resisted, claiming that since the

agreement between the parties had terminated, it was no longer
obliged to abide by the grievance procedure of the contract. Though
1973/76, Article XXI, reprintedin Record on Appeal at 46, 72.
3. See Board of Educ., Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School Dist. v. BellmoreMerrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 347 N.E.2d 603, 605-06,
383 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (1976); Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc. v. Board of
Educ., Union Free School Dist. No. 3, 33 N.Y.2d 229, 236, 306 N.E.2d 791, 796, 351
N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (1973).
4. The concept of incremental salary increases is indigenous to teachers' contracts. The diagram below indicates "steps" as well as levels of educational background. Both variables, together with a mechanical formula based upon percentage
increase which is sometimes further tied to a cost of living adjustment, represent the
salary of each individual teacher for the prospective academic year. A teacher achieves
an additional step for each year that he has taught in the district. Therefore, if teacher
X received a salary in accordance with step four for the 1975-1976 academic year, X
automatically receives a salary for the 1976-1977 academic year based upon the figure
corresponding to step five. Therefore, if X, who has a master's degree, and who has
taught for four years in the Wyandanch School District, receives $13,465 for the 19751976 academic year, he will receive $13,992 for the 1976-1977 academic year since the
additional year of teaching has placed the teacher on step five:
TEACHERS BASE SALARY SCHEDULE
EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 1, 1975
STEP BA

BA+15 BA+30 BA+45 BA+60 MA

PH.D
ED.E
MA+15 MA+30 MA+45 MA+60

1
2
3
4
5

10879
11353
11832
12290
12789

16

10505
10879
11353
11832
12311

11353
11832
12311
12789
13262

11832
12330
12828
13328
13839

12311
12808
13308
13808
14307

11884
12408
12933
13465
13992

12408
12933
13465
13992
14516

12933
13465
13992
14516
15049

13465
14019
14576
15135
15686

13992
14551
15100
15658
16211

19328

19788

19788

20314

20847

21798

22323

Contract Between Wyandanch Board of Education and Wyandanch Teachers Association, 1973/76 app. IV, reprinted in Record on Appeal at 46, 85.
5. Such status is afforded pursuant to the New York Public Employees' Fair
Employment Act, N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977)
(commonly known as the Taylor Law).
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the agreement had technically ended, article XXII of the contract
contained a survivor clause 6 which extended the contract's terms. It

provided:
In the event a successor contract or provisions are not agreed
upon on or before the termination date of the present contract or
provisions, all terms of the present contract and all working conditions will remain in effect until the successor contract or provisions have been entered into. Upon agreement all salaries, ben-

efits and working conditions will be retroactive to the termination
7
date of the present contract or provisions.

Holding the survivor clause valid and the collective bargaining
agreement still effective, the lower court granted the Association's
cross-motion to compel arbitration," and denied the Board's applica-

tion to stay arbitration. 9 The lower court reasoned that the inclusion
in the agreement of the survivor clause reflected the "unambiguous
intent of the parties" 10 to have the agreement continue beyond expiration until a new agreement was formed.1 1 The only limitation on

this extension was that during the interval between the old and new
contracts, the parties had to continue to bargain collectively and in
12
good faith.
6. Survivor clauses are neither widely accepted nor readily included in public
sector collective bargaining agreements. Those that are included are the result of hard
bargaining. Each party to agreements containing such clauses believes that it will be
the party protected by its terms in the event of a substantial hiatus between expiration
of one agreement and commencement of a successor agreement. Survivor clauses
may be viewed as a codification of the accepted concept that the status quo of terms
and conditions of employment must be maintained during negotiations of the parties
aimed at the execution of a successor agreement. This concept is commonly known as
the Triborough doctrine since it was first enunciated by the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) in Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 5
P.E.R.B. 3037 (1972). In Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1977), the
court held that continuing payment of salary increases after expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement is not maintenance of the status quo.
7. Contract Between Wyandanch Board of Education and Wyandanch Teachers
Association, 1973176, Article XXII(B), reprinted in Record on Appeal at 46, 75-76.
8. See Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 7534 (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 396
N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977). A motion to compel arbitration is made pursuant to N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7503(a) (McKinney 1963).
9. An application to stay arbitration is made pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 7503(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
10. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 7534, at 7585 (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 474,
396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977).
11. Id. at 7586.
12. Id. at 7587.
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The appellate division reversed, 13 granting the Board's applica-

tion to stay arbitration. It held that the survivor clause could not be
interpreted to require the payment of salary increments after the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 14 The major flaw
in the unanimous opinion, written by Justice Shapiro, was the misconception of the issue. The court framed the issue, stating: "Whether under the contract between the parties salary increments were

to be continued after the expiration of the contract and during the
period the parties were in negotiation over the terms of a new con-

tract. "15
Although the resolution of this issue was essential in determining the parties' rights under the collective bargaining agreement, it
was beyond the court's jurisdiction. The resolution of this problem
rested on a contractual interpretation which, according to the
agreement, was within the purview of an arbitrator. The court

should have limited its inquiry to determining whether the grievance was arbitrable in light of the dispute resolution provisions in
the contract. 16 It is well-settled that in determining questions of
17
arbitrability, courts should not address the merits of a dispute.
Under the terms of the contract, the parties were to submit all

grievances concerning "the meaning, interpretation or application of
the contract"' 8 to binding arbitration. Whether salary increments
13. See Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977).
14. See id. at 481, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
15. Id. at 475, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (footnote omitted).
16. See G.E. Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 265 N.E.2d 747, 317
N.Y.S.2d 326 (1970); Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d
190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965). Furthermore, not only is a court limited to determining
whether a dispute is arbitrable, but it must find a dispute arbitrable "unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." G.E. Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d
285, 291, 265 N.E.2d 747, 751, 317 N.Y.S.2d 326, 332 (1970) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)). But see Acting
Superintendent of Schools of the Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 369 N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1977), where the
New York Court of Appeals recently limited the presumption of arbitrability to nonpublic sector arbitration. The effect of this case is still undetermined because the arbitration clause there was sufficiently different and restricted in comparison to most
public sector arbitration clauses. One month after Liverpool, the New York Court of
Appeals compelled arbitration of a dispute which palpably fell within a broad arbitration provision. South Colonie Cent. School Dist. v. Longo, 43 N.Y.2d 136, 371 N.E.2d
516, 400 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1977).
17. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S, 564, 567-68 (1960);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1963).
18. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 7534, at 7584 (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 474,
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were due after the term of the agreement had expired undoubtedly
involved the meaning, interpretation, or application of the agreement. Therefore, given the viability of the agreement which provided the mechanism for such dispute resolution, only an arbitrator
could properly decide the issue.
The court should first have addressed whether there was a continuing agreement upon which to base the Association's demand for
arbitration. 19 The answer rests on whether the survivor clause, as an
integral part of the otherwise expired collective bargaining agreement, should trigger the agreement's ongoing effectiveness. Instead,
the court erred in addressing the merits of the dispute.
Second, the court should have addressed whether judicial enforcement of such a survivor clause was repugnant to the public
policy of the state. The public policy arguments were briefed in detail by both appellant and respondent. 20 Appellant Board contended
that judicial enforcement of the survivor clause and, by implication, of the entire collective bargaining agreement for an unknown
duration, would violate public policy: The continuation of terms and
conditions of the old contract would remain effective at the whim of
respondent Association. Thus, until the Association agreed to new
terms, it would be able to compel the Board to abide by terms of the
predecessor contract. This was even more problematic in light of the
extreme financial difficulties faced by the Board because of an eroding tax base in the Wyandanch School District. 21 The Association
counterargued that as a matter of contractual construction, the court
should uphold the terms and conditions of the contract, including
resort to the grievance machinery; the survivor clause was the result
of hard and continuous collective bargaining by the parties, and thus
warranted judicial enforcement in the same manner as any other
contractual clause. In addition, the Association urged that under
396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977). The quoted language is common in broad arbitration clauses such as that contained in the Wyandanch agreement.
19. This issue was formulated and stated by the respondent in its brief: "Is the
public policy of this State contravened by judicial enforcement of a duly negotiated
provision in a Collective Bargaining Agreement providing for the continued effectiveness of such Collective Bargaining Agreement pending the execution of a successor
agreement between the parties?" Respondent's Brief at 6. Judicial enforcement under
the contract in question would signify the continuing effectiveness of the grievance
machinery and, therefore, the continuing ability of the parties to seek arbitration of
disputes involving the meaning, application, or interpretation of the contract.
20. See id. at 7-17; Appellant's Brief at 5-13.
21. Appellant's Brief at 13.
22. See Respondent's Brief at 21-25.
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rules of contractual construction, a contract of indefinite duration
should continue for a reasonable time, and a court examining such a
contract should endeavor to enforce rather than to invalidate such an
agreement.2 3 Instead of confronting the public policy issue of contractual indefiniteness, the court disposed of the matter by examining the underlying merits of the dispute: whether salary increments
were due after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
In its analysis of arguments, the court first discussed the recent
holding of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Niagara
Wheatfield Administrators Association v. Niagara Wheatfield Central School District.2 4 Niagara involved an application to vacate an
arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator's construction
of the applicable provision of that contract violated public policy.
As in the Wyandanch contract, the Niagara collective bargaining
agreement provided an extension of the terms and conditions of
the agreement past the expiration date pending its modification by
mutual agreement of the parties in subsequent negotiations. 25 After
the expiration of the Niagara contract, the school district refused
to pay salary increments provided therein. A grievance was filed
by the Association under the arbitration clause in the expired contract and the matter ultimately reached arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the grievant and ordered the increments paid.
The Fourth Department vacated the arbitrator's award, stating that
the survivor clause, which "[put] the Board at a serious disadvantage
and [required] it to negotiate upon petitioner's terms or continue
indefinitely the compensation index contained in the [expired contract]," 2 6 was against public policy. However, the court remanded
the matter to the arbitrator, enabling him to formulate an award
which did not contravene public policy. The court indicated:

23. Id. at 21-24; see also Board of Educ. v. Port Jefferson Station Teachers
Ass'n, 88 Misc. 2d 27, 31, 387 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 1976); notes 26 & 33 infra
and accompanying text.
24. 54 App. Div. 2d 498, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667 (4th Dep't 1976).
25. The language of the Niagara survivor clause was more nebulous than that of
the Wyandanch clause. It read in pertinent part: "The current negotiated agreement
and established fringe benefits between the Board of Education and the NWAA [petitioner] shall remain in effect until modified or changed by mutual agreement in subsequent negotiations." Collective Bargaining Contract, quoted in Niagara Wheatfield
Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist., 54 App. Div. 2d 498, 499, 389
N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (4th Dep't 1976). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
26. Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist.,
54 App. Div. 2d 498, 502, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670 (4th Dep't 1976) (emphasis in original).
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As an abstract principle of law, we conceive that an award favorable to petitioner, albeit less so than the vacated award, could be
made by the arbitrator by determining, for example, that [the
survivor clause] of the agreement shall remain in effect for a reasonable time after [the expiration date] in which the board and
27
petitioner may negotiate a new contract.
Thus, Niagara implies that a collective bargaining agreement, al-

though seemingly violative of public policy in continuing indefinitely, can be construed as continuing for only a reasonable time.

This construction corrects the defect that had contravened public
policy.
The Wyandanch court acknowledged the Niagara holding, but
stated that subsequent to Niagara, the New York Court of Appeals
in Haines v. City of New York2 8 asserted that the reasonable time

rule for seemingly indefinite contracts does not apply to contracts of
employment. 2 9 Relying on Haines, Wyandanch disposed of the reasonable time theory, explaining: "Of course, collective bargaining
30
agreements are contracts of employment."
This treatment of Haines is both puzzling and misleading. First,

Wyandanch erroneously cited the Haines abandonment of the reasonable time theory as the holding of that court. 3 1 However, this
issue was discussed only in dicta in Haines. Second, Wyandanch
inappropriately expanded the Haines concept of employment con-

tracts to include collective bargaining agreements. Although collective bargaining agreements deal in detail with the terms and condi-

tions of employment, such agreements should not be considered
32
employment contracts in the Haines sense. All of the cases cited
in Haines in its abandonment of the reasonable time theory involved
27. Id. This concept of a reasonable time in relation to the duration of labor
contracts has also been espoused in Board of Educ. v. Port Jefferson Station Teachers
Ass'n, 88 Misc. 2d 27, 387 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1976). There the court accepted the
proposition that a municipal contract of seemingly indefinite duration need not be
invalid, and can be construed as continuing for a reasonable time.
28. 41 N.Y.2d 769, 364 N.E.2d 820, 396 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1977).
29. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 478 n.3, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 n.3 (2d Dep't

1977).
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. The cases cited by the court in Haines were Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v.
Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923); Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, 98 N.E.
18 (1912); Churchill Evangelical Ass'n, Inc. v. CBS, 236 App. Div. 624, 260 N.Y.S. 451
(4th Dep't 1932); Outerbridge v. Campbell, 87 App. Div. 597, 84 N.Y.S. 537 (2d Dep't

1903).
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servitude, whereby an employer seeks to compel his employee to
work for a definite time. These servitude cases bear no relation to
the concept of public sector collective bargaining agreements such as
the one before the court in Wyandanch. Collective bargaining
agreements do not compel an employee to work for his employer at
all, much less for any specified period. Rather, they simply set forth
the conditions of employment once an employment relationship is
established.
Thus, even though the court in Wyandanch discussed the reasonable time rule and the judicial enforcement of seemingly indefinite contracts, it summarily and unsatisfactorily dismissed this
major issue. 33 In one stroke, the court eradicated the longstanding
proposition that a court must, if possible, avoid any unreasonable
interpretation of a contract and sustain it where there is a construc34
tion which will render the contract lawful.
Niagara's decision that a collective bargaining agreement, although technically expired, may continue for a reasonable time 35 is
neither diminished nor superseded in any way by Haines. That the
court in Niagara ultimately ruled that the arbitrator's interpretation
of the survivor clause violated public policy, however, is not to say
36
that the survivor clause in Wyandanch must likewise fall.
In Niagara the court was able to look at the arbitrator's interpretation of the survivor clause, which extended the contract
until a new one was agreed to by the parties. 3 7 The court in Niagara
intimated that such interpretation confers upon the union unfair

33. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 478 n.3, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 n.3 (2d Dep't
1977).
34. Board of Educ. v. Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n, 88 Misc. 2d 27, 387
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Justice Lazer, in a well-analyzed and well-researched
opinion, set forth this concept in great detail. See id. at 31, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 518. See
also note 22 supra and accompanying text.
35. Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist.,
54 App. Div. 2d 498, 502, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670 (4th Dep't 1976).
36. The proceeding in Niagara was an application pursuant to N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
LAw § 7511 (McKinney 1963) to vacate the award on the grounds that it violated
public policy. However, in Wyandanch, judicial intervention was sought before the
matter had been heard by an arbitrator. The remedy sought there was a stay of arbitration pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7503 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977). As may
be discerned from the applicable procedural statutes, the scope of permissible judicial
intervention is more circumscribed once the issue has been passed upon by an arbitrator pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate.
37. See Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School
Dist., 54 App. Div. 2d 498, 502, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670 (4th Dep't 1976).
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bargaining power. 38 In Wyandanch, however, there had been no
interpretation by an arbitrator. An arbitrator might have adhered to

the reasonable time theory and concluded that the clause was valid
so long as it extended the terms of the agreement for only a reasonable time. Alternatively, had the arbitrator arrived at a decision that

violated public policy, the court could have vacated his award. It
is futile for the court to surmise how the arbitrator would have per-

ceived the survivor clause. The matter should have proceded to
arbitration, where a determination on the merits could have been

made. The parties bargained for arbitration and it should not be
left to the court's discretion to hold otherwise, "unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." 3 9
After disposing of Niagara, the majority discussed two cases,
both of which concerned the payment of salary increases after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The first, Corbin v.
County of Suffolk, 40 concerned a union's allegation that the county's
refusal to pay salary increments after the agreement's expiration was
a violation of the status quo, 41 and therefore the court "should entertain petitioners' suits and exercise its equitable jurisdiction so as to
42
maintain the status quo and thus prevent an irreparable wrong."
In Corbin the Second Department disagreed with the union's contention, ruling that the provision for salary increments in the collective bargaining agreement was no longer in effect once the agreement had expired. 43 Additionally, the court noted that because
the allegations amounted to an improper practice charge, 44 and
only the Public Employment Relations Board 45 (PERB) can deter38. See id.
39. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960); G.E. Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 265 N.E.2d 747, 751, 317
N.Y.S.2d 326, 331 (1970); accord, Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380,
384-85, 207 N.E.2d 190, 192-93, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 145-46 (1965). See note 16 supra
and accompanying text.
40. 54 App. Div. 2d 698, 387 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1976).
41. See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
42. Corbin v. County of Suffolk, 54 App. Div. 2d 698, 699, 387 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296
(2d Dep't 1976).
43. See id.
44. See id. The improper practice charge involved a refusal to bargain in good
faith by unilaterally and coercively changing the status quo during negotiations. Improper practice charges are set forth in N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 209-a (McKinney 1973).
45. The New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) was
created pursuant to the Taylor Law, N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 205 to 209-a (McKinney
1973 & Supp. 1977), to aid public employers and employees in resolving labor dis-
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mine the validity of such a charge, 46 the union had sought its remedy in the wrong forum.
Corbin and Wyandanch are distinguishable. Corbin involved an
improper practice charge while Wyandanch concerned an application to stay arbitration. In addition to this procedural difference,
there is a crucial factual difference of which the appellate division in
Wyandanch took note: "In the present case the court is confronted
with a collective bargaining agreement which, by its own terms, has
expired but which, unlike Corbin, contains an express survivorship
proviso. Thus Corbin has little, if any, bearing on this case." 47 This
precise factual difference was also present in the second case discussed by the majority, Board of Cooperative Educational Services
48
(BOCES)v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board,
yet the court concluded that BOCES was dispositive of Wyan49
danch.
In BOCES the union filed with PERB an improper practice
charge alleging that the employer had unilaterally violated the status
quo by failing to pay salary increments after the collective bargaining
agreement's expiration. PERB agreed with the union and ordered
the employer to negotiate in good faith, "such order contemplating
that [the employer] will cease and desist from refusing to pay increments to those of its employees entitled to increments under the
recently expired agreement." 50 The matter was taken up to the
court of appeals, which held that the refusal to pay these salary
increments after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreeputes. The services afforded by PERB include factfinding, mediation, conciliation,
and "superconciliation" of collective bargaining negotiations. PERB also serves as a
forum in which to resolve improper labor practice charges. It has had progressively
diminishing effectiveness, however, both in contract settlement and investigation and
in resolution of alleged improper practice charges. This is due in part to the attenuated
process involved in judicial enforcement of PERB orders. There has recently been a
legislative move to combine PERB with the New York State Department of Labor and
the New York State Mediation Board for the presumed purpose of eliminating duplication of functions and needless expense. See S.1337, A. 1637 (1977) (Senate and
Assembly bills).
46. See Corbin v. County of Suffolk, 54 App. Div. 2d 698, 699, 387 N.Y.S.2d 295,
296 (2d Dep't 1976); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
47. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 478-79, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (2d Dep't 1977).
48. 41 N.Y.2d 753, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1977).
49. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 479, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (2d Dep't 1977).
50. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., Rockland County v. BOCES Staff Council, 8
P.E.R.B. 3018, at 3027 (1975), modified, 50 App. Div. 2d 832, 377 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d
Dep't 1975), modified, 41 N.Y.2d 753, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1977).
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ment did not violate the employer's duty to negotiate in good
faith.5 1 Addressing PERB's argument that the payment of the increments preserves the relationship of the parties until a new agreement is negotiated, the court stated:
[Such arguments] are based on the erroneous assumption that it is
the "existing relationship" which is being preserved, when, in
reality, such payments extend or change the relationship established by the parties....
To say that the status quo must be maintained during negotia change
ations is one thing; to say that the status quo includes
52
and means automatic increases in salary is another.
The appellate division's heavy reliance upon BOCES was misplaced; the differences between BOCES and Wyandanch are apparent. BOCES concerned an improper practice charge, an alleged
violation of an employer's duty to negotiate in good faith by unflaterally changing the status quo. In opposing the Board's application
to stay arbitration in Wyandanch, the Association never contended
that the Board violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by refusing to grant the salary increments. 5a Most importantly, the collec51. See Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 754, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 1175, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (1977).
52. Id. at 758, 363 N.E.2d at 1177, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
53. However, upon entry of the order and judgment, Board of Educ., Wyandanch
Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, No. 76-18315 (Sup. Ct. Jan.
11, 1977), in the court below, both parties found it necessary to file improper
practice charges. In his opinion upholding the survivor clause and, therefore, the
grievance machinery and the arbitrability of the subject disputes, Justice DeLuca
noted: "Here the parties entered the agreement with the intent that it would continue
until a new one was reached. So long as the parties continue to negotiate in good faith,
the survivor clause should remain operative in the interim." Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 7534, at
7587 (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1977).
The order and judgment which was signed, entered, and eventually appealed from
states in part: "ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the collective bargaining agreement between the parties hereto shall remain in full force and binding effect upon the
parties so long as the parties continue to negotiate in good faith and until a successor
agreement is reached between the parties hereto .... " Board of Educ., Wyandanch
Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, No. 76-18315 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11,
1977) (order and judgment). In light of the foregoing language in both Justice DeLuca's decision and the resultant order and judgment, counsel for the Wyandanch Board
of Education thought it advantageous to interpose an improper practice charge alleging, inter alia, a refusal by the teachers association to bargain in good faith pursuant
to N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 209-a(2)(b) (McKinney 1973). In response thereto, and to
preserve its own rights, the teachers association thereafter interposed a cross-charge
pursuant to N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 209-a(1)(a), (d) (McKinney 1973), alleging failure to
abide by the status quo through the taking of certain unilateral actions considered
detrimental to the rights of the Association and its members.
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five bargaining agreement in Wyandanch, unlike that in BOCES,
contained a survivor clause which, in effect, extended the terms of
the agreement beyond expiration. When the court of appeals in
BOCES confronted PERB's theory of the case, it stated:
The inherent fallacy of PERB's reasoning is that it seeks to make
automatic increments a matter of right, without regard to the
particularfacts and circumstances, by establishing a rule that
failure by a public employer to continue such increments during
5
negotiations is a violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith.1
Indeed, the appellate division in Wyandanch cited this very pronouncement of the court of appeals, 5 5 but departed from the principle involved, stating: "[W]e interpret the broad language of the
Court of Appeals to void any attempt to compel the payment of increments under an expired contract .... "56
In BOCES the court was disturbed that PERB granted salary
increments as a matter of right "without regard to the particular facts
and circumstances." 57 Thus, it may be implied that the court must
look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine
whether the increments should be paid. Unfortunately, the Appellate Division, Second Department, rather than rely on the particular
facts of Wyandanch which included a collective bargaining agreement with a survivor clause and a procedural setting much different
from that in BOCES, 58 interpreted the language of the court of
appeals to mean that any attempt to force the payment of these
59
increments must fail.
The appellate division then quoted a lengthy passage from
BOCES concerning automatic salary increments as connected with
54. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations

Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 758, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 1177-78, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1977)
(emphasis added).
55. See Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 480, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Dep't 1977)
(quoting Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations
Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 758, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 1177-78, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1977)).
56. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 480, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 707 (2d Dep't 1977).
57. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations
Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 758, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 1177, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1977).
58. BOCES involved the filing of an improper practice charge before PERB,
while Wyandanch concerned an application to stay arbitration. See notes 9 & 50-52
supra and accompanying text.
59. See Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 480, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 707 (2d Dep't 1977).
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the financial uncertainty of a public employer. 60 Notwithstanding its
fiscal problems, the Board was contractually obliged to arbitrate
payment of the increment by virtue of the survivor clause. The
economic plight of a contracting party does not authorize it to shirk
its obligations. 6 1 The arbitrator, however, may consider the parties'
financial resources in formulating an award.
There are only two similarities between BOCES and Wyandanch. First, the collective bargaining agreements in both cases
had, by their terms, technically expired. Second, the dispute in each
case centered around, among other things, continued payment by
public employers of salary increments during the crucial period between the technical expiration of the predecessor agreement and the
execution of a successor agreement. But here, under a logical reading of the cases, is where similarities end and important differences
begin.
BOCES did not require construction of a collective bargaining
agreement. Rather, it involved the question whether refusal to pay
salary increments during the interval between the expired and successor contracts violated the policy of maintaining the status quo
during negotiations. This policy is commonly referred to as the
Triborough doctrine. 6 2 A court may alter such a judicially-created
policy based upon new or differing facts or persuasive arguments of
counsel. For a court, however, to decide the merits of a grievance is
an improper assertion of jurisdiction. Its merits should have been
resolved by adhering to an internal grievance procedure agreed
63
upon by the parties.
The Second Department could have struck down the underlying agreement which set forth the grievance machinery by addressing whether a contract of seemingly indefinite duration contravenes
the state's expressed public policy. 64 In fact, the court in Wyan60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Pettinelli Elec. Co. v. Board of Educ., 56 App. Div. 2d 520, 391
N.Y.S.2d 118 (1st Dep't 1977); Professional Staff Congress/CUNY v. Board of Higher
Educ., 83 Misc. 2d 900, 373 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also note 80 infra.
62. See note 6 supra.
63. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
64. In Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs Ferry United Teachers,
90 Misc. 2d 819, 395 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1977), the court addressed that issue. The
case involved an application to stay arbitration of grievances because the collective
bargaining agreement had expired. The teachers contended that the contract was still
in effect because a clause in the contract provided that after expiration, the agreement
would remain in effect until amended or superseded. Discussing numerous cases
which dealt with the issues of status quo and survivor clauses, the court determined
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danch had a perfect opportunity to do that in its citation and analysis
of the Niagara decision. 65 However, it failed to take this route
thereby leaving the threshold issue, the efficacy of a contract containing a survivor clause, unanswered. In so doing, the court in
Wyandanch allowed the Board to retreat from its contractual obligations in two ways. First, it declared the survivor clause invalid as it
pertained to salary increments. 66 Second, it determined that the
dispute was not arbitrable. 6 7 Consequently, the Board was relieved
of its obligation to pay the increments and to proceed with the
dispute in the arbitration forum.
The court's decision in Wyandanch tacitly carved out an exception to the well-settled principle 68 that any grievance between
teachers and a board of education under a broad arbitration clause is
subject to arbitration. This is not to say that there have been no
exceptions previously enunciated. Indeed, the New York Court of

Appeals has held that arbitration may be limited by statutory prohibitions or by case law, 69 as well as by "[p]ublic policy, whether
derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law, or in neither." 70 For example, in Cohoes City School
that the stay of arbitration should be granted because:
Such a contractual provision which would permit this board, or any other
public body, to vest in a union of its employees the power unilaterally to
perpetuate for an indefinite or indeterminate period of time, determinable
only at the sufferance of such union, wages and other terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of the economic conditions of the school district
or municipality, would be violative of the public interest and public policy.
Id. at 828, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 994. See also Board of Educ., Teachers City School Dist. v.
Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976);
Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37
N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
65. Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 477, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (2d Dep't 1977)
(citing Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist., 54
App. Div. 2d 498, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667 (4th Dep't 1976)). See also text accompanying
notes 23-26 supra.
66. See Board of Educ., Wyandanch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch
Teachers Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 474, 477-78, 396 N.Y.S.2d 702, 707 (2d Dep't 1977).
67. See id.
68. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (relying on Board of
Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109,
331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972); see also Board of Educ. v. Chautauqua Cent. School Teachers
Ass'n, 41 App. Div. 2d 47, 341 N.Y.S.2d 690 (4th Dep't 1973).
69. See Syracuse Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., Syracuse City School Dist.,
35 N.Y.2d 743, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
70. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-17, 339 N.E.2d 132, 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (1975).
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District v. Cohoes Teachers Association, 1 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the right to make tenure decisions cannot be
bargained away by a board of education:
In our view the authority and responsibility vested in a school
board under the several provisions of the Education Law to make
tenure decisions cannot be relinquished .... [U]nder the Educa-

tion Lawv a board cannot surrender its authority to terminate the
employment of a nontenured teacher at the end of the probationary period. Any provision of a collective bargaining agreement
which would have that effect is accordingly unenforceable as
against public policy.72

In Board of Education, Great Neck Union Free School District v.
Areman, 73 this same court held that a board of education may not
bargain away its right to inspect teacher files; a dispute concerning
an alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement whereby
the board of education improperly inspected these files is therefore
not arbitrable.
Until Wyandanch, tenure and inspection of teacher files were,
according to New York's highest court, the only two contract disputes in the public sector which were not arbitrable: 74 Both derive
their basis from statutory law. 75 The Second Department has delin-

eated yet another exception to arbitration, but has cited no policy
grounds for doing so. 7 6 It merely cited to a number of quotations from
71. 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976).
72. Id. at 777, 358 N.E.2d at 880, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
73. 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977).
74. The tenure issue has been modified so that if a board of education has not
followed evaluation procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, an
arbitrator may direct temporary reinstatement of the nontenured teacher until the
board of education complies with these procedures when deciding whether or not to
recommend tenure. See Board of Educ., Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School Dist. v.
Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603,
383 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1976).
75. See Board of Educ., Great Neck Union Free School Dist. v. Areman, 41
N.Y.2d 527, 529, 532, 362 N.E.2d 943, 945, 947, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145, 147 (1977)
(citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1709, 3012-3013, 3031 (McKinney 1973)); Cohoes City
School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777, 358 N.E.2d 878, 880, 390
N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (1976) (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 2509, 2573, 3012-3013, 6206
(McKinney 1973)).
76. In Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975), Judge Fuchsberg, in a
concurring opinion, was concerned with courts in the future deciding arbitrability on
general public policy grounds:
[I]t is a mistake for the majority to write, in restrictive tones and in vague
generalities, of public policy "concerns which may be involved, however
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BOCES. Moreover, it has already been demonstrated that this
heavy reliance upon BOCES is unfounded. 77 Unlike disputes over
tenure and inspection of teacher files, 78 survivor clause disputes do
not involve the delegation of authority to the Board by a statute.
Rather, the issue of survivor clauses falls within the area of permissible collective bargaining. 79 Wyandanch's departure from this
principle is particularly puzzling in light of the court's failure to
enunciate any restrictive public policy or prohibitions in statutes or
case law to support such a departure. 80 Although neither the New
rarely that may ever be" even though "it does not appear that there is any
restrictive policy" involved in this case.
The notion that courts may freely assume the role of arbiters of public
policy is a very much exaggerated one. Most especially, they should avoid
doing so in the face of a statutory scheme which bespeaks its own policy
considerations, public policy having indeed been authoritatively defined as
"found in the Constitution, the statutes or judicial records" of our State.
Id. at 618, 339 N.E.2d at 134, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 430 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
77. See notes 52-61 supra and accompanying text.
78. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. See also Board of Educ., Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School Dist. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 383 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1976).
79. As a foundation to the understanding of public sector labor relations, it Is
important to note that public employers are required to negotiate with public
employee organizations over the terms and conditions of employment. N.Y. Civ. SERv.
LAw § 204(2) (McKinney 1973). However, the New York Court of Appeals has stated:
"[A] public employer possesses broad power voluntarily to negotiate all matters in
controversy, whether or not they involve 'terms and conditions of employment' subject
to mandatory bargaining, and agree to submit such controversies to arbitration." Board
of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 273, 353 N.E.2d 569, 572, 386
N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (1976) (citing Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972)).
80. Similarly, in Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268,
353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976), the union wished to bring to arbitration a
grievance concerning the layoff of a number of teachers. The collective bargaining
agreement contained a job security clause which provided that a teacher may not be
terminated for budgetary reasons. Faced with a financial crisis, the City of Yonkers
was compelled to make cuts in the budget, which in turn compelled the Board of
Education to lay off a number of employees. The Board unsuccessfully tried to persuade the court of appeals that the fiscal circumstances warranted a stay of arbitration.
The court responded:
Consequently, in this arbitration proceeding, the court has no power to
pass upon the merits of the dispute (CPLR 7501). The merits are for the arbitrators to decide. It is also for the arbitrators to fashion the remedy appropriate to the circumstances, if it is determined that the agreement has been
breached. In this context, of course, the financial condition of the city and
its ability to fund the teaching positions are relevant and may be considered.
But since there is no statute or controlling decisional law, or public policy
prohibiting a public employer from voluntarily agreeing to a job security
clause, the clause was valid and the parties should proceed to arbitration.
Id. at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 573-74, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
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York Education Law"' nor the Taylor Law 2 specifically compels the
Board and the Association to negotiate with respect to a survivor
clause, that such clause has been negotiated and incorporated in a
collective bargaining agreement should estop the Board from attacking the validity of such a clause. The New York Court of Appeals stated:
Public employers must, therefore, be presumed to possess
the broad powers needed to negotiate with employees as to all
terms and conditions of employment. The presumption may, of
course, be rebutted by showing statutory provisions which expressly prohibit collective bargaining as to a particular term or
condition but, "[i]n the absence of an express legislative restriction against bargaining for that term of an employment contract
between a public employer and its employees, the authority to
provide for such [term] resides in the [school board] under the
83
broad powers and duties delegated by the statutes."
This notion of permissible subjects of bargaining was also addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Susquehanna Valley
Central School District v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers Association.8 4 In Susquehanna the school district applied for a stay of arbitration of a dispute with the teachers association concerning a reduction in staff size. The collective bargaining agreement provided for
stabilization of the size of classes and of the staff. When the new
school budget was introduced after passage, it reflected a staff reduction. A grievance was brought by the teachers: The grievance unresolved, the teachers attempted to bring it to arbitration. The school
district contended that staff size was within the exclusive prerogative
of the school board and, therefore, not arbitrable. The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that although staff size was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the parties were free to
negotiate on this subject and, therefore, free to agree to submit it to
arbitration.8 5
Like staff size, the survivor clause is a permissible subject of
collective bargaining. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the court in
Wyandanch to follow the reasoning of Susquehanna.
81.

N.Y. EDUC. LAw (McKinney 1969).

82. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw Art. 14 (McKinney 1973) (commonly known as the Fair
Employment Act).
83. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122,
130, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972) (citations omitted) (brackets in

original).
84. 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
85. See id. at 617-18, 339 N.E.2d at 134, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
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CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the appellate division in Wyandanch failed to
discern the Board's underlying motive for staying arbitration. In his
opinion below, Justice DeLuca perceived this motive, stating:
Initially, the court is disturbed that a party to a collective bargaining agreement, such as the School Board here, who has, via the
give and take of negotiation agreed to a contract provision, such as
a survivorship clause, should now seek to declare that provision
void as against public policy because such a result would now be
suitable to it at the bargaining table. The requirement that the
parties bargain in good faith, (Civil Service Law section 209.1(d))
should call for an estoppel against the School Board's position that
a portion of its agreement, acceptable when made, is now, over
three years later, against public policy .... 816
It is imperative that this holding of the New York Appellate
Division, Second Department, in Wyandanch not be followed by
other courts. Unfortunately, the decision in Wyandanch will not be
taken up to the court of appeals. Subsequent to the appellate division's decision, the parties completed their negotiations aimed at a
successor agreement, and entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement which settled and withdrew all outstanding grievances
brought pursuant to the predecessor agreement.
Therefore, although the principles set forth by the court in
support of its decision were largely unsound, the appellate division's
pronouncement in Wyandanch will remain unchallenged. The
Wyandanch holding constitutes an aberration in generally accepted
principles. To follow its holding would perpetuate a misinterpretation of public sector labor law, and would disrupt the effectiveness of
public sector employer-employee relations.
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